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1Abstract
The quality of newly constructed single-family houses is usually homoge-
neous in and heterogeneous between neighborhoods. Such quality-clustering
will be caused by the variation of natural amenities throughout a suburban area.
Clustering will be enforced if the quality of neighboring buildings increases the
value of newly constructed ones. To disentangle the natural amenity eect and
the neighborhood eect, we use data from Berlin and exploit that the endoge-
nous eect was weakened during the socialist period. Our results show that
the exogenous variation caused by buildings constructed during this period still
causes lower quality new buildings in the East of the city.
Keywords: housing supply, housing externality, natural experiment
JEL Classication: R31, D62, C31
21 Introduction
Everyone who has lived in a single-family house neighborhood knows that neighbors
care not only about the appearance of their own house but also value tidy sidewalks,
nice gardens, and appealing building facades. There is no pleasure to be gained from
looking out of one's house onto a run-down building or a park littered with waste.
In economists' parlance, the quality of natural amenities and surrounding buildings
are positive externalities, generating a benet to those consuming them. Whereas
it is hard to imagine that a building's physical quality should have no eect on
the wellbeing of those living next to it, disagreement might exist regarding the
importance of this eect (Mills, 1979, pp. 528). It is also important to understand
if households just consume the quality of neighboring buildings or if households'
investment in the physical quality of their own houses is aected too.
In a recent paper, Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) examined the magnitude of hous-
ing externalities. Using data from a housing revitalization programme in Richmond,
Virginia, they established that the programme increased land values over a period
of six years by 12 to 35 percent (depending on the targeted neighborhood). This
provides empirical evidence for positive externalities. Their paper does not examine,
however, whether the increase in land values is caused by the improvements of the
targeted buildings alone or if it is further enforced (weakened) by an endogenous
feedback eect where non-targeted landowners alter investments in their buildings
too. In particular, their paper does not answer if we should expect building im-
provements between neighbors to be complements or substitutes.1
In this paper, we use data from Germany's capital Berlin to examine if an en-
dogenous feedback eect between the quality of neighboring buildings exists. We
1Ioannides and Zabel (2003, 2008) provide empirical evidence that a household's housing demand
depends positively on the mean housing demand of its neighbors. This is consistent with a comple-
mentary eect where individual households' maintenance decisions are aected by the maintenance
choices of their neighbors.
3exploit that Berlin was divided between 1949-1989 into two halves with dierent
economic-political systems. The east half was the capital of the centrally-planned
socialistic German Democratic Republic (GDR); the west half, lying completely in
GDR territory, was a state of the market-based Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
Between 1961-1989, the city was divided physically by the Berlin Wall, which was
erected by the socialistic regime to prevent its citizens from leaving the GDR.2 All
linkages between Berlin's west and east halves were cut. Figure 1 shows a map of
the city, outlining the east and the west halves. In 1989, the GDR collapsed and
the Berlin Wall fell. A year later, Germany was reunied and Berlin became united
again.
Usually, the circular causation inherent in urban development makes it impossi-
ble to detect if the quality of buildings have an eect on each other. The natural
experiment of Berlin's division provides the exogenous variation needed to detect
such an endogenous eect. With Berlin's boundaries set in 1920 and amenities
such as parks, lakes, forests, and transportation network in place well before 1948,
the built environment received dierential treatment in the centrally-planned east
and the market-based west half during the 1949-1989 period. After the reunica-
tion, building construction is carried out again by prot-maximizing developers. If
quality matters, then buildings constructed in Berlin's east half during the division
should impact on the quality of newly constructed buildings.
This identication strategy requires that the quality of buildings in the east
half constructed during the treatment period was determined exogenously. As we
will discuss in detail in Section 2, building construction between 1949-1989 in the
east half followed principles dierent from those in any other period. Instead of
relying on market participants' prot-maximizing behavior, encouraged by strong
private property rights, the socialist regime relied on authoritarian planning, price
restrictions and curtailing of private ownership (Bernhardt, 2005, p. 106). This
2The construction of the Wall included the demolition of buildings close to it and the set up of
the infamous \death strip".
4institutional framework aected, particularly in later years of the treatment period,
the quality of the building stock. The GDR did not have the economic resources
to maintain buildings and construct new buildings to the same standard as it was
possible in the market-based west half. The quality of newly-constructed buildings
was mainly determined by the availability of construction materials and personal
networks of prospective owners.
It is clear that the physical appearance of the city changed in both halves of the
city during the period 1949-1989, in particular in inner-city districts, where buildings
destroyed during the war had to be replaced and new means of transportation had to
be accommodated.3 However, only in the west half was this process intermediated
by the market. Therefore, the setting of the treated east half and the untreated west
half of the city corresponds to a natural experiment with a `before and after design
with an untreated comparison group' (Meyer, 1995, 3.2). We exploit this setting in
our empirical analysis.
We use a non-cooperative externality model to understand the role amenities
can play for the quality of newly-built houses. Our model shares features with the
models of Philippi and Luenberger (1977) on the upkeep of rental tenements, Schall
(1976) on urban renewal, and Strange (1992) on spatial density. Our model dis-
tinguishes explicitly between given natural and built amenities and the endogenous
quality of buildings. The model leads to three testable implications. First, if the
level of a given amenity is a positive externality, land prices should be positively
related to it. This prediction holds irrespectively of whether or not the quality of
buildings is endogenous. Second, if natural amenities aect households' marginal
willingness to pay for quality, then buildings will be clustered by quality. Third, if
the quality of buildings is endogenous, the impact of local natural amenities will be
enforced (weakened) further if the quality of neighboring buildings are complements
(substitutes) for each other.
3Such as inner city highways (`Stadtautobahn') and Tegel Airport in the west half of Berlin.
5Our empirical analysis uses information on transactions of single-family houses
and undeveloped residential land that occurred between 1996-2008. The buildings
of the single-family houses cover all of the three dierent periods of Berlin's recent
history. Using the nonparametric method of Bajari and Benkard (2005), we compute
an index of the building quality for each house transaction. The index controls for
physical deprecation and structural characteristics and reects a building's quality
as perceived by the buyers and sellers active in the Berlin single-family house market.
We test the rst implication of the model by running linear regressions of land
prices on an ordinal summary measure of local amenities. We nd that prices of
undeveloped land increase signicantly with the measured level of amenity quality.
This conrms that prices of developable residential land are positively related to
amenities. Regarding the second implication, we examine the spatial autocorrelation
of the building quality index. We nd that quality is clustered in fairly homogenous
neighborhoods, as expected when households' marginal willingness to pay for quality
is aected by neighboring amenities. To test the third implication, we exploit the
exogenous change of the built environment during the GDR period. In particular,
taking pre-1949 as the before and post-reunication as the after period, we use
the dierence-in-dierences methodology to examine the reduced form eect of the
quality of neighboring buildings on the quality of newly-built ones. Our estimates
show that the quality of new buildings in the east half of the city is signicantly lower
than one would expect in the absence of any low quality additions to the housing
stock during Berlin's division. Conditional on the fraction of buildings added to
east neighborhoods between 1949-1989, the reduced quality translates into a loss
of building value of about 6 to 17 percent relative to a new building in Berlin's
untreated west half. This result remains robust if non treated neighborhoods, i.e.
neighborhoods with little post-1949 additions to the housing stock, are used as an
additional control group.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of Berlin's suburban development history and motivates why Berlin's division led to
6an exogenous treatment of the housing stock. Section 3 presents a model of housing
investment with endogenous building quality. The model gives three predictions,
which we test using data from Berlin's single-family house market. Section 4 presents
the data. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology and gives the test results.
The nal Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides further details of the analysis.
2 Berlin's suburban history
2.1 Period up to 1945
The development of residential single-family areas began in Berlin in the second half
of the 19th century, when industrialization caused rapid economic growth. In 1850,
Berlin had a population of 418,733, increasing to 774,498 by 1870, and 1.9 million by
1919. Single-family houses were attractive for wealthy households, who did not want
to live in the polluted and crowded city. Early single-family houses were dominantly
villas, mostly constructed in villages and small towns surrounding Berlin. In only a
few decades, these towns and villages grew to sizeable cities themselves.
Suburban areas were mostly developed by prot-seeking land companies (`Terrain-
Gesellschaften'), which raised sucient capital via share issues to undertake large
projects. These companies acquired large sites, mostly former manors (`Ritterg uter'),
planned the settlement, provided infrastructure (such as sewerage, schools, train sta-
tions, subway lines, and steamboat connections) and then subdivided and sold the
remaining land. The construction of individual single-family buildings was carried
out by independent small rms either on their own account or on behalf of the future
house owner (Fisch, 1989).
The managers of land companies were aware that the aesthetic quality of build-
ings may have an eect on prospective buyers' willingness to pay and thus on the
development prots. Exemplary is J.A.W. Carstenn, responsible for the settlements
Friedenau, Wilmersdorf, and Lichterfelde in the south of Berlin, whose company not
7only constructed streets and train stations connecting to Berlin, but in 1881 also
convinced Siemens & Halske to run the world's rst electric tram in Lichterfelde (Bo-
denschatz, 2001a). The locations of these settlements were chosen because of their
proximity to the summer residences of the Prussian gentry and `Natursch onheiten'
(natural beauty), as Carsteen called it, such as lakes and forests. To ensure the built
quality of a development, Carstenn's company, like other land developers, included
covenants in the land sales contracts stipulating that the buildings to be constructed
had to be of appropriate standard (Braum, 2003, p. 42; Bernhardt, 2008, p. 77). The
covenants did not specify the building design, although land companies occasionally
suggested specic architects.
In the 1890's, building co-operatives started providing single-family houses for
middle class families.4 The buildings were simpler and more standardized than
those in the settlements initiated by prot-maximizing land companies. The im-
portance of building co-operatives for single-family house construction increased
substantially after 1920, when greater Berlin was established. The new city brought
many surrounding towns and smaller cities under central administration, enlarging
Berlin's population to 3.9 million inhabitants. The prot-maximizing land compa-
nies adapted to the changing market by shifting their focus from land development
to building construction. Large projects were often conducted jointly with build-
ing co-operatives and with nancial support from the government. Such projects
were often designed by modernist architects and consisted of multi-dwelling tene-
ment buildings and single-family houses (`Hufeisensiedlung' in Neuk olln, 1925-1927,
`Onkel-Tom-Siedlung' in Zehlendorf, 1926-1932). The design of the buildings was
often functional and used building materials such as glass and steel. Semi-detached
and row houses became more common (Kuhn, 2001).
After 1933, the year in which the Nazis took power, two further settlements were
4At the same time, the most luxurious German villa development took place. Landscaping for
the 'Villenkolonie Grunewald' in the southwest of Berlin included the creation of two new lakes and
a complete remodeling of the area using the excavated soil (Bodenschatz, 2001b).
8developed in Zehlendorf (`Berliner Strasse', 1937-1938, `SS-Kameradschaftssiedlung
Krumme Lanke', 1938-1940). The latter development was for SS personnel and
buildings had a folkloristic design. Community buildings were planned, following
the national-socialist ideology, but were not realized (Braum, 2003). Individual
construction of single-family houses by prot-maximizing developers remained very
important too, and took place in proximity to the early villa developments, (Bern-
hardt, 2008, pp. 80) and H auermann and Kapphan (2002, p. 88). Single-family
house construction stopped with the outbreak of the war in 1939; Berlin's popula-
tion peaked at 4.5 million in 1942.
2.2 Period between 1945-1989
After the war, Germany was divided into four occupied zones, each controlled by one
of the four allies (United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, and the
Soviet Union). Berlin, located completely in the Soviet zone, had special status and
was itself divided into four zones. In 1949, the GDR was founded in the Soviet zone.
Berlin's east half, the city's Soviet zone, became the capital of the new centrally-
planned socialistic state. In he same year, the FGR was founded in the remaining
three occupied zones. Berlin's west half became a federal state of the new market-
based democratic state. In 1950, 2.1 million people lived in the west half and 1.2
million in the east half.
In Berlin's west half, construction of single-family houses stayed in the hands of
prot-maximizing developers. The construction industry consisted of many small
and highly competitive rms. Most construction took place in the traditional single-
family house districts Zehlendorf, Wilmersdorf, and Steglitz. Buyers often came from
the central Kurf urstendamm area, which attracted high-rent paying lawyers, archi-
tects, and medical doctors (H auermann and Kapphan, 2002, pp. 77). Most single-
family houses were individual projects, designed by independent architects. Only
a few developments combined single- and multi-family buildings, such as the `Gar-
9den City D uppel' in Zehlendorf (1983-1986) (Braum, 2003). Large multi-dwelling
developments were constructed too, rst in central inner-city locations and later at
the outskirts of the Berlin's west half. Particular in the rst decades of the period,
traditional pre-war buildings were less valued by the modernists zeitgeist, which
led to dilapidation and occasionally to the demolition of such buildings. Infras-
tructure projects, such as new and wide roads, utilities, and multi-family dwellings,
changed the appearance of many existing neighborhoods. However, beginning in the
seventies, neighborhood preservation societies lobbied for a more careful treatment
of the old settlements (Bodenschatz, 2001b, pp. 141, for Grunewald; Bodenschatz,
2001a, pp. 119, for Lichterfelde). At the end of the period, careful restoration and
modernization made these buildings highly attractive again.
In the GDR, the construction industry was nationalized into a few state-owned
regional industrial conglomerates (`Wohnungsbaukombinate', initially 21, later 15),
which produced standardized parts, constructed buildings, and were also responsi-
ble for the interior tting. Berlin's east half, the capital of the GDR, had its own
conglomerate. Many private tradesmen and their rms had to merge with the indus-
trial conglomerates. Industrial building construction required dierent skills than
the construction of traditional single-family houses. This implied that the knowl-
edge on the upkeep of the existing buildings, which was engrained in the defunct
traditional rms, disappeared over time. Self-employed independent architects faced
an even tougher fate; they had to work in hierarchical organized state-owned rms,
thereby losing their creative independence (Topfstedt, 1999, pp. 434).
Economic constraints led the GDR to focus on mass-produced large tower blocks.
The construction of these blocks exploited economies of scale of standardization
(`Typisierung') and the prefabricated parts, especially concrete slabs (`Plattenbau').
It also implied that the constructed buildings had a very homogeneous appearance.
Huge settlements of such blocks were concentrated in a few locations in Berlin's
east half. For instance, 65,000 new ats were constructed in towers with 11 oors
between 1976 and 1989 in Berlin Marzahn. The ats were small and the quality
10poor (Strubelt et al., 1996, pp. 36). In 1991, 166,000 people lived in these buildings
(H auermann and Kapphan, 2002, pp. 164).
With the focus on multi-dwelling construction, single-family house construction
contributed only 10 percent of the overall volume. The housing development pro-
gramme, which was enacted at the VIII. Parteitag der SED 1971, encouraged the
construction of such houses to attract skilled workers and families to areas where
their skills were needed (Bernhardt and Wolfes, 2005). However, it became obvi-
ous that mass-produced concrete slabs were not suitable and too expensive for the
construction of individualized single-family houses (Kegler, 2005, p. 212).
Single-family house construction had to rely mostly on self-initiative. Land
was allocated by local councils and districts and therefore|at least in principle|
available. In most cases, land was allocated on empty parcels in already existing
single-family house settlements. Once allocated, the prospective housebuilder ob-
tained the right of land use, but not full ownership (which did not exist in the social-
ist state). Construction material was generally in short supply in the GDR, and in
particular so for the non-prioritized single-family house construction. Builders had
therefore to use what they could get.5 This included nding suitable building ma-
terial, transportation (a car was often a necessity), and the will and the experience
to go through with the project.6 This implied that only tradesmen and technical
procient workers were able to built their own home (Kegler, 2005, p. 214). The
spread of building material, its poor quality, and the fact that many projects were
carried out without sucient professional oversight led to new buildings that were
neither in line with natural amenities nor the existing building stock (Kegler, 2005,
p. 223).
5See Joachim Nawrocki: Bau selber, Genosse. Wie in der DDR der Bau von privaten Eigen-
heimen forciert und animiert wird, published in the West-German weekly Die Zeit, No. 13, March
31st 1972, p. 27.
6Used material was employed when suitable, such as railway tracks instead of T-beams (Pauli,
2005, p. 37).
11The socialistic centrally planned system led therefore to a leveling of building
qualities between neighborhoods. Moreover, the pre-1949 building stock was not
maintained and deteriorated. An example is the Haus Lemke, constructed in 1932
in the east half district Alt-Hohensch onhausen by the Bauhaus architect Mies van
der Rohe. The interior design and the furniture was also provided by van der Rohe's
workshop. The Lemkes left the house in 1945, afterwards the Soviet military used it
as garage and storage room. In 1962, the GDR security service (MfS) started using
the house, but also did not maintain it.7
The socialist society also provided less opportunities for individual dierentia-
tion and placed less value on it. The social status eect of houseownership was
therefore less pronounced and the economic incentives to distinguish the own house
less developed than in the west (Herlyn and Harth, 1996, p. 264). Single-family
house inhabitants consisted mainly of two groups. First, members of the political
and cultural elite, who obtained possession of existing houses via lease contracts
(` Uberlassungsvertrag'). The original owners of such houses had mostly left the
country out of political and economic reasons. Second, members of a more tradi-
tional middle-class, who valued homeownership and chose to acquire a `right to use'
of the land (`Dingliches Nutzungsrecht'). This right was recorded in the land register
(Glock et al., 2001, pp. 542).
2.3 Period from 1990
Following the German reunication in 1990, the laws of the FRG became eective in
the east part. Special laws were enacted to facilitate restitution of owners that were
expropriated during the socialistic regime. It was the guiding principle of this process
that rightful owners could log claims by the end of 1992 and should be reinstated
after the claims were proven. However, individuals who became homeowners in
7The building was restored in 2000-2002. It is now open for visitors and houses exhibitions of
modern art, see www.miesvanderrohehaus.de.
12the east half during the GDR could be exempt from this principle. It mattered if
inhabitants obtained the right of use for the single-family house or not. If they had
only a lease contract, then the expropriated rightful owner could claim payment of
50 percent of the market value or repossess the house. If inhabitants had the right
of use, they gained full ownership without the need of any additional payment. As
Glock et al. (2001, p. 547) write, this implied frequently that the GDR political and
cultural elite lost houses they seized for themselves during 1949-1989. Households
who constructed a building on land allotted to them by the GDR administration
could choose after the reunication to buy the land from the rightful owner at half
of the assessed land value or they could request a ground lease instead.
In addition to restitution and clarication of ownership rights, the renovation of
the infrastructure and the transport connections with west half started immediately
after the reunication. Generous subsidies were provided for houseowners in the
east half to renovated their buildings.
We present next our model of building construction in a neighborhood. The
quality of natural amenities and of neighboring buildings are positive externalities
and land owners might adjust their own investments in reaction to the investment
of neighboring land developers. The model of housing investment provides us with
predictions that will be tested with our data.
3 Housing investment with endogenous building quality
3.1 Households
A household living in the city spends income y on the composite good x 2 R+ and
the quality of the building q 2 R+. The price per unit of x is given and normalized
to one, the price for q is p, and the budget constraint is y = x + p. Household's
preferences are represented by the utility function u(q;x;a) = x + f(q;a). The
vector a 2 fz: z 6 a; z 2 RJ
+g measures the levels of the J local amenities in the
13neighborhood, such as the qualities of neighboring buildings and the amount of green
space nearby. The function f(q;a) is continuously dierentiable and strictly concave
in q.8 We assume further that f(0;a) = 0 and that f(q;a) is strictly increasing in
each of a's elements if q > 0.9
The city has many dierent neighborhoods in which a household could locate.
A spatial equilibrium requires that a household's utility level is the same in all
neighborhoods. We set this utility level equal to y. Household's willingness to pay
function for q becomes p(q;a) = f(q;a). It follows from our assumption on f(q;a)
that p(q;a) > 0 with strict inequality for q > 0. We can also assume that p(q;a) 6 y
for all feasible combinations of q and a, because y is a free parameter of the model.10
3.2 Landowners
The prot function of the owner of an undeveloped site is
(q;a) = p(q;a)   c(q) : (1)
Construction cost c(q) is a continuous dierentiable convex function without xed
cost, c(0) = 0. We assume further that rqp(0;a)   rqc(0) > 0. It follows from the
strict concavity of p(q;a) and the convexity of c(q) that the prot function is strictly
concave in q and (0;a) = 0. Prot is also strictly increasing in each of the ajs if
q > 0.
Optimal quality: The landowner chooses q 2 [0;q] to maximize the prot in
Eq. 1. The solution to this problem is the optimal quantity, which is given implicitly
8Strict concavity implies rqf(q;a) > 0 and rqqf(q;a) < 0, where rxf(x) denotes the rst
derivative of f(x) with respect to x, rxxf(x) denotes the second derivative.
9In case that aj is a disamenity, such as noise or pollution, a higher level of aj indicates less of
the `bad'.
10It should be mentioned that any strictly quasi-concave utility function leads to a strictly concave
willingness to pay function for q. Using the quasi-linear utility function reduces the complexity of
the analysis.
14by the rst order condition rqp(q;a) = rqc(q).11 The second order condition
holds rqqp(q;a)   rqqc(q) < 0 too. The optimal quality q(a) is therefore a





Result 1: The response of q(a) to a change of aj depends on the sign of the
numerator in Eq. 2. Three cases are possible:
(i) The numerator is zero and household's marginal willingness to pay for quality
is unaected by the change of the amenity level. Landowners maximize prots
by constructing buildings with homogenous quality.
(ii) The numerator is strictly positive and households have a higher marginal will-
ingness to pay for building quality at higher levels of the amenity. Building
quality and the amenity are complements. Landowners will maximize prots
by constructing buildings with higher quality at better locations.
(iii) The numerator is strictly negative and households have a lower marginal will-
ingness to pay for building quality at higher levels of the amenity. Building
quality and the amenity are substitutes. Landowners will maximize prots by
constructing buildings with lower quality at better locations.
Result 2: Whereas q(a) can increase, decrease, or stay constant with an increase
in aj, the prot will increase always,
raj(q;a) > 0 : (3)
This follows from Eq. 1 with the envelope theorem.
We next examine the interaction of landowners in a neighborhood with S > 2
sites. Each site s is owned by a dierent owner and sites are developed simultane-
ously. We split the vector of amenities for site s, as, into the two vectors q s and e.
11We assume that q does not bind and q
 is interior.
15The (S 1) vector q s contains the qualities of all buildings except qs. With a slight
abuse of notation, we let q denote the vector of building qualities in the neighbor-
hood, where q 2 [0;q]S. The building quality q is an endogenous externality, because
the S developers choose the prot maximizing quality for their site s in reaction to
each other. e measures the level of exogenous amenities in the neighborhood and
e 2 fz: 0 6 z 6 e; e 2 RJ S+1
+ g.
Taking q s as given, the quality q
s(q s;e) maximizes the prot of landowner s
from development. We write compactly gs(q;e) = q
s(q s;e). Note that rqsgs(q;e) =
0. We collect the S individual quality functions gs(q;e) in the vector valued function
g(q;e). We also write (q;e) for the (S  1) vector of prots.12
Result 3: A Nash equilibrium fulls
qn = g(qn;e) : (4)
In such an equilibrium, no landowner wants to change the chosen building quality
given the building qualities chosen by other landowners. Given that [0;q]S is a
nonempty, compact, and convex set and that g(q;e) is a continuous mapping of the
set into itself, it follows from Brouwer's xed point theorem that qn exists.
We next conduct comparative statics by focussing on a stable equilibrium. Sta-
bility requires that
_ q = B(q   qn) (5)
converges to zero, where B  rqg(qn;e)   I.13 This requires that all eigenvalues of




jbisj > 0 for s = 1;:::;S (7)
12rq(q;e) has zeros on its diagonal and all o-diagonal elements are strictly positive, see Eq. 3.

















  qs ; (6)
where the term in the curly brackets is a rst-order approximation of gs(q;e) around q
n.
16is sucient for the eigenvalue criterion to be fullled.14 The stability assumption in
Eq. 7 implies that if landowner s deviates from the Nash equilibrium quality by dqn
s,
then the reaction by all other landowners, 0dqn
 s, will be smaller in absolute value.
With Eq. 4, an increase of the exogenous amenity j leads to change of the building
qualities of
dqn = C 1rejg(qn;e)dej ; (8)
with C   B. We assume in the ongoing that all o-diagonal elements of C are of
the same sign.
Result 4: First, the building quality will not vary between neighborhoods if quality
is not aected by exogenous amenities, rejg(qn;e) = 0. Second, for the case where
building quality is aected by exogenous amenities, we focuss on the case of com-
plements, rejg(qn;e) > 0. The result for the case of substitutes, rejg(qn;e) < 0,
follows similarly. Using Result 1, we can distinguish three cases:
(i) If building qualities are neither complements nor substitutes for each other, we
have C 1 = I and it follows from Eq. 8 that dqn > 0. Everything else equal,
it follows that the building quality should be higher in neighborhoods with a
higher level of amenity ej.
(ii) If building qualities are complements for each other, the o-diagonal elements
of C are all negative and the column sums all positive, see Eq. 7. The matrix
C 1 is then positive and has a strictly positive diagonal. It follows from Eq. 8
that dqn > 0.15 Everything else equal, the eect of an increase in amenity ej
is enforced by the endogenous feedback eect.16
14Eq. 7 ensures that B is a Hadamard matrix; because B has also a negative diagonal, the result
follows (Murata, 1977, Chap. 1, Theorem 20).
15Under these conditions, C is a Minkowski matrix and all principal minors are positive. The
Hawkins-Simon theorem provides the non-negativity result, see Murata (1977, Chap. 1: Lemma 1,
Chap. 2, Theorem 30).
16We have
C






17(iii) If building qualities are substitutes for each other, C 1 is positive quasi-
denite, but no general result can be derived.17 This only changes if we assume
either symmetric external eects or if specic functional assumptions are made.
In the case of symmetry, location in the neighborhood does not matter, and C
is symmetric with identical o-diagonal elements and the eect of exogenous
amenity j on the building quality, measured as rejgs(qN;e), is the same for
all s. It follows that dqN
s > 0 for all sites, see Appendix A.1. The model of
Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) is an example for functional assumptions that
ensure that the endogenous substitutional reaction is smaller than the initial
exogenous eect.
Buildings can be erected instantly and the land values in a neighborhood equal
therefore the prots from development. If the exogenous amenity j increases, land
values increase by
d = frq(qn;e)C 1rejg(qn;e) + rej(qn;e)gdej : (10)
The gradients of the neighborhood prot function are both strictly positive.
Result 5: Observe rst that d > 0 even if external amenities have no eect on the
building quality and rqg(qn;e) = 0. This implies that land has a higher value in
neighborhoods with nicer external amenities. The quality of buildings, however, is
the same in dierent neighborhoods. This eect on the land values will be enforced if
cases (i) and (ii) of Result 4 apply. In both cases, C 1rejg(qn;e) is strictly positive
and land values increase with exogenous amenities. In case (iii) of Result 4, however,
it depends on further assumptions about the magnitude of the substitution between
building qualities whether d is positive or not.
The model can be extended easily to treat exogenous building construction.
In particular, if some landowners have no access to the appropriate construction
for the nonnegative square matrix rqg(q
n;e) Murata (1977, Chap. 4, Theorem 11)
17C has a positive dominant diagonal and is therefore positive quasi-denite. Its inverse is then
positive quasi-denite too, see Murata (1977, Chap. 2, Theorem 37).
18materials and techniques, then the quality of their building will be dierent from
the prot-maximizing quality q. Assume that the previously ignored landowner
S + 1 is of this type. The quality of the building is qS+1. The other S landowners
behave as before. In this case, the S elements of rqS+1g(qn;e) have the same sign
as the endogenous feedback eects.
Result 6: If there is no endogenous feedback eect, a change of the exogenous qS+1
has no eect on the quality of other buildings in the neighborhood. It has, however,
an eect on land values in the neighborhood, because land values increase with the
level of exogenous amenities, d = rqS+1(qn;e) > 0, see Result 5. If endogenous
building qualities are complements, then a higher exogenous qS+1 increases land
values and the level of the endogenous building qualities. If endogenous building
qualities are substitutes, then the net eect on land values and the endogenous
building quality is ambiguous. If the endogenous reaction does not fully crowd out
the initial eect of a change in qS+1, then a higher exogenous qS+1 decreases the
quality of other buildings in the neighborhood, see Result 4.
The theoretical analysis shows that positive externalities alone are not sucient
to motivate variation of the building quality between neighborhoods. Nicer locations
with higher exogenous amenities imply higher prot opportunities for landowners
and therefore higher land values, but this does not necessarily imply higher quality
buildings too. A positive correlation between exogenous amenities and building
qualities requires that both are complements. If building qualities in a neighborhood
react to each other, then such a correlation will be enforced further if qualities are
complements. No general result could be derived for the case where endogenous
qualities are substitutes.
The model provides us with three testable implications. First, if the level of ex-
ogenous amenities is a positive externality, we expect that land values are positively
related to these amenities, see Result 5. In case that endogenous building qualities
are substitutes, this requires that the feedback eect is not too strong. The rst step
19of our empirical analysis is therefore to analyze if given exogenous amenities have
a positive eect on the value of undeveloped land. Second, if exogenous amenities
aect households' marginal willingness to pay for quality, buildings will be clustered
by quality, see Result 4. In the second step, we therefore examine if buildings are
clustered between neighborhoods. Third, if the quality of buildings is endogenous,
the impact of given natural amenities will be enforced (weakened) further if the qual-
ity of neighboring buildings are complements (substitutes). We use the setting of
the natural experiment to examine if an exogenous decrease of the average building
quality in a neighborhood aects the quality of newly-built houses.
4 Data and construction of quality index
The main data for our empirical analysis comes from Berlin's Committee of Valua-
tion Experts (GAA, Gutachterausschuss f ur Grundst uckswerte) out of its transaction
database.18 The data covers 1996-2008 and provides information on all arms-length
transactions of single-family houses and undeveloped residential land in Berlin. In-
formation includes the transaction price, the geographic location, and building char-
acteristics if the site is developed and therefore a house. We use this data in several
stages of our analysis. In particular, we use the data to compute a normalized
measure of building quality for each transacted house.
We also use data from other sources in the analysis. Berlin's Statistical Oce
provides information on Berlin's area and population through history (Statistisches
Landesamt Berlin, 2001). Neighborhoods can be delineated according to the 23 ad-
ministrative districts of 1990 and the 195 statistical areas dened by the Statistical
Oce, respectively.19 The Statistical Oce also provides information from the cen-
18The GAA is entitled by law to request and collect information on real estate transactions occur-
ring in Berlin. The GAA uses this information to conduct valuations needed for administrative and
ocial purposes (public court, legal portioning, compulsory purchase) and to provide information
about the real estate market to professionals and the interested public.
19The statistical areas reect more closely the city's neighborhoods than the substantially larger
20sus on the housing stock at the level of statistical areas (Statistisches Landesamt
Berlin, 1991, 1997), and publishes the Berlin consumer price index (CPI) in its Sta-
tistical Report M I 2. We use the CPI to convert nominal gures into real year
2000 Euros. Digital maps and further geo-coded information is provided by Berlin's
Senate Department for Urban Development. This information includes the location
of lakes, district and statistical area boundaries, and an expert-based rating of the
overall amenity quality of an area.20
[Figure 1 about here.]
4.1 Description of single-family house transactions
We observe 18,961 single-family house transactions, which show a wide variation
of building vintages. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the year of construction for
the buildings of the observed houses. 7,841 buildings were constructed before 1949,
6,745 during the division period 1949-1989, and 4,374 since the reunication in 1990
and until 2008.
[Figure 2 about here.]
At the level of statistical areas, the transacted houses closely resemble the age dis-
tribution of the housing stock in the year of reunication.21 This indicates that the
transacted houses are fairly representative with respect to the current age distribu-
tion of Berlin's single-family housing stock.
The locations of the transacted houses are shown in the map of Berlin in Fig-
ure 1. Section 2 explained that the locations of many suburban neighborhoods were
districts. Some of the data used, however, is only available on the district level.
20The rating indicates the level of natural amenities, the quality of existing buildings, and access
to public transport and shopping facilities within the neighborhood.
21Figures are not reported here.
21established by the end of the pre-1949 period. Figure 1 shows a fair mixture of build-
ing vintages in most neighborhoods, so that the initially developed areas continue
to be attractive for new construction. Zoning regulations, which were enacted in the
FRG in 1960, may also contribute to the local clustering. The observed proximity
of buildings of dierent vintages is required to test the predictions of our model.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the single-family house transactions by
period of construction and by half of the city. The land value of a transacted house is
predicted with a semiparametric regression using transaction prices of undeveloped
residential land. The building value is the transaction price net of the notional land
value. The mean building value of houses located in the west half is always higher
than the building value of houses in the east half in each of the three periods. The
mean building values are aected by physical depreciation and building character-
istics. The last variable `quality index' in the rst panel of Table 1 controls for such
eects. The index ranks the (unobserved) quality of buildings on the unit interval,
where a value of 0.5 represents a median quality. The computation of the land value
and the quality index is explained in Subsection 4.3.
[Table 1 about here.]
According to the average quality index, the quality of buildings in the west half was
non-decreasing over the three periods, whereas it fell during the GDR period in the
east half. It is now still lower in the east half than it was before the division of the
city.
4.2 Description of residential land transactions
We observe 20,754 undeveloped residential sites.22 Table 2 presents summary statis-
tics. The standard deviation of the price variable reveals that there is substantial
22The initial data set includes transactions of all land sites in Berlin. Information on zoning
regulations and existing structures in the neighborhood of a site allow us to exclude non-residential
sites from the sample.
22variation in observed land prices. Most of the sites are located in suburban neigh-
borhoods as indicated by the mean distance to Berlin's central business districts
(CBD).23 According to the expert-based rating of the amenity quality, almost half
of the sites are located in neighborhoods with medium quality. A sizeable amount
of sites are located in low and high quality neighborhoods, respectively. The lower
three panels of Table 2 summarize further characteristics of the site, as well as
of the transaction process. These variables will serve as controls in our empirical
applications.
[Table 2 about here.]
4.3 Construction of quality index
We employ the hedonic model proposed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) to compute
the quality of a building.24 The resulting quality index is based on the notion that
market participants' willingness to pay for otherwise identical buildings will increase
with their inherent quality. The distribution of building values, i.e. the house price
net of the value of the underlying land, therefore allows us to rank buildings with
respect to their unobserved quality.
Specically, let pH
i denote the transaction price of house i and let vL
i represent
the value of the underlying land.25 The house price is the sum of the value of the





23We consider two separate CBDs: for land in the the west (Breitscheidplatz, close to the
Kurf urstendamm) and the east (Alexanderplatz, close to the historical centre).
24Bajari and Benkard (2005) extend the Rosen-Lancaster type hedonic model of demand for
dierentiated products by incorporating a hedonic price function that has a general nonseparable
form and allows for unobserved product characteristics. We employ their rst stage estimation
procedure to infer the unobserved characteristic, i.e. the building quality.
25We use no subscript for the period of sale, because we conduct the analysis of building values
in real terms.
23We collect observable characteristics of the building in the vector xi and denote
its inherent, but unobserved, quality with qi. The observed characteristics, such as
age or state of repair, are assumed to be independent of the unobserved quality.26
Furthermore, we assume that xi and qi are mapped into building values by the
following nonparametric function
vB
i = v (xi;qi) ; (12)
where v() is assumed to be (i) Lipschitz continuous and (ii) strictly increasing in

















= qi ; (13)
where the second equality holds because of the independence between xi and qi,
and the last equality holds after normalizing qi using its distribution function.27
The quality of a building can thus be represented by the conditional cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of building values.
In order to actually obtain the quality index dened by Eq. 13, we proceed as
follows. First, we estimate the notional land value for each house in our sample. Let
pL
it denote the transaction price of an undeveloped residential site i in period t, and
let si denote its size in square meter. Let li = (l1;i;l2;i) 2 R2 be cartesian coordinates
that represent a location in Berlin. We employ the following partial linear model
lnpL
it = zit + m(li;si;t) + "it ; (14)
where the vector zit collects a set of binary variables that capture unusual features of
the land site, as well as unusual circumstances of the transaction process , see Table
26Given the nonseparable form of Eq. 12, an independence assumption is not as restrictive as in
linear models. This is because nonseparability allows interaction between the unobserved qi and
observed xi that replicates models of heteroscedasticity.
27The normalization implies that the marginal distribution of the quality index, qi, is uniformly
distributed on the unit interval.
242.  is a parameter vector and m() is a smooth function that need to be estimated.
The random error term "it is assumed to be mean independent from the explanatory
variables. We estimate Eq. 14 using the approach pioneered by Robinson (1988).
Details are given in Appendix A.2.





z0tb  + b m(l0;s0;t)
o
; (15)
where the time period t is set according to date of the house sale.28 The correspond-
ing indicators in z0t are set to one if the house has unusual features that relate to
the land and in the presence of unusual circumstances during the transaction pro-
cess. We then compute the building value using the observed transaction price of
the subject house and the notional land value, see Eq. 11. Nominal building values
are converted into real terms (year 2000 Euros) with the Berlin CPI.
Finally, we estimate the conditional CDF of building values in real terms, see
Eq. 13. In particular, we employ the nonparametric kernel estimator proposed in Li
and Racine (2008). We include the building's age, oor size, a set of binary indicators
for its state of repair, and a set of binary indicators for the type of building in the
conditioning set xi.29 The inherent quality of each building is thus assumed to be
independent from physical depreciation, oor size, and type of building. Further
details on the estimation procedure are given in Appendix A.3.
Summary statistics of the estimated quality index are given in the last row of
Panel A in Table 1. While the mean quality of buildings constructed before 1949 is
roughly the same in both halves of the city, the quality in the east half is lower for,
28By taking the antilog of predicted log prices, we obtain an consistent estimate of the median
of the land price distribution rather than its mean. An asymptotic unbiased re-transformation of
median prices to mean prices requires an estimate of the standard error of the prediction. For
computational ease we refrain from this correction.
29We distinguish between three state of repairs (bad, average, excellent) and three building types
(detached, semi-detached, row house).
25both, buildings constructed during the division and after reunication. To formally
inspect if these dierences are statistically signicant, we employ a nonparametric
Wilcoxon rank sum test. The test's null hypothesis is that of no dierence, so that
the quality index is equally distributed in both halves of the city. Table 3 gives
results of the test. For buildings constructed before 1949, we can reject the null
hypothesis of equally distributed building qualities at the 3.1 percent signicance
level, see Column (1). Although statistically signicant, the point estimate for the
probability of a building in the west half of being of better quality than a building
in the east half is 51.5% and therefore not very dierent from 50%, see Column
(2) in Table 3.30 The probability dierential between the west and east halves
increases for buildings constructed during the division of Berlin, 1949-1989, and
buildings constructed since reunication in 1990. In both cases, the test results
indicate clearly that building qualities are dierent. On average, additions made to
the housing stock in the east half during the period 1949-1989 were of lower quality
than in the west half. Moreover, these low quality additions seem to impact on
the quality of current constructions as indicated by the continuing divergence of the
quality index in the third period under consideration.
[Table 3 about here.]
5 Testing the implications of the model
In this section, we take the testable implications of the theoretical model presented
in Section 3 to the data. First, we examine if natural and built amenities are a
positive externality by regressing the price of undeveloped land on an expert-based
rating of the overall quality of a neighborhood's amenity level. Second, we examine if
building qualities cluster into homogenous neighborhoods as implied by households'
30Berlin's most luxurious pre-1949 developments can be mainly found in the southwestern neigh-
borhoods of Dahlem, Grunewald, and Lichterfelde, see Section 2. It is thus not surprising that the
quality of pre-1949 buildings in the west half is on average slightly larger than in the east half.
26willingness to pay for amenities. We therefore apply tests for spatial autocorrelation
in the building quality index. While the tests for these two implications of the model
are straightforward and, in principle, applicable to data from any city, it is more
challenging to test if the building quality of neighboring houses is complementary
or substitutive for the quality of other buildings. This is because a high level of
natural amenities alone may attract the development of high-quality buildings. If
not all relevant amenities can be observed, the quality of buildings will be correlated
because both they are related individually to these amenities.31 We avoid this
problem by exploiting the fact that natural amenities remained fairly unchanged
in Berlin since the 1920ties, while the addition of GDR buildings during Berlin's
division lowered the average building quality in the east half. This unique set-
up provides the exogenous variation needed to identify the eect of neighboring
buildings on the quality of newly constructed ones.
5.1 Land prices and neighborhood amenities
The rst implication of the model is that land prices should be positively related to
the level of natural and built amenities in a given neighborhood if these amenities
are a positive externality. To test for the presence of externalities we employ linear
regressions of the following form
ln ~ pL
it = 0 + 1a1;it + 2a2;it + xit + "it ; (16)
where ~ pL
it is the price per square meter of the undeveloped site i in period t. The
binary indicators ak;it, k 2 (1;2), are set to one if the site is located in a street
31Such identication problems arise often in models of social interactions, where observed group
behavior could be the result of correlation between individuals' (un)observed characteristics and
not the result of their interaction (Manski, 1993, 2000). See Carion-Flores and Irwin (2010), Irwin
and Bockstael (2002, 2004), and Noonan and Krupka (2011) for studies on the identication of
neighboring amenity eects|land use and landmark buildings|on house prices.
27block with an overall low and high level of neighborhood amenities, respectively.32
Amenity levels are assigned to each site according to the amenity rating provided by
Berlin's Senate Department for Urban Development, see Section 4. The reference
rating is a neighborhood with a medium amenity level. Additional control variables
are collected in the vector xit. In our most extensive specication these controls
include the distance to the CBDs, binary indicators for unusual features of the site,
as well as unusual circumstances of the transaction. All specications include a full
set of district dummies and time dummies for the quarter of sale.
We t Eq. 16 to the transaction data on undeveloped residential land by ordinary
least squares. We expect a price discount for sites located in neighborhoods with a
low level of amenities, 1 < 0, and a price premium for sites located in neighborhoods
with a high level of amenities, 2 > 0.33
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Standard errors are corrected for intra-
district correlation to account for spatial correlation of the error terms. We present
estimates for two specications of Eq. 16. In Specication 1, only our key explana-
tory variables, a1;it and a2;it, and a set of time and district dummies are included.
In Specication 2, additional control variables are added. In both specications, the
estimated coecients on the neighborhood amenity indicators, b 1 and b 2, have the
expected signs and are statistically signicant (b 2 in Specication 2 only at the 10
percent level). Relative to residential land in a neighborhood with an average level
of given amenities, sites in neighborhoods with a low level of amenities sell with a
rebate of about 9 to 10 percent. Residential land in neighborhoods with a high level
of amenities, on the other hand, demand a price premium of about 8 to 10 percent.
[Table 4 about here.]
32Even though the amenity rating is reported separately for each street block, there is little
variation within neighborhoods as dened by statistical areas.
33Eq. 16 tests for presence of externalities that stem from any neighborhood amenity. The
estimates will thus reveal the eect of the overall level of neighborhood amenities on land values.
28The estimated coecients on the control variables in Specication 2 have rea-
sonable signs. Notably, the coecient on the indicator variable if the site has direct
access to a lake or river (`Lake side') is positive and statistically signicant.34 The
presence of this particular amenity increases the price of land by about 33 percent.
This large eect can be attributed to the fact that sites with lake access are likely
to have high levels of other amenities too. The estimated coecient thus picks up
the direct eect of lake access and positively correlated amenities. Overall, Table 4
provides evidence that the neighborhood and site-specic amenities acts as positive
externalities.
5.2 Spatial clustering of building quality
The second implication of the model is that buildings will be spatially clustered
by quality if amenities aect households marginal willingness to pay for a build-
ing's quality. To test for such quality clustering we employ Moran's test for spatial
autocorrelation (Anselin, 1988, Ch. 8). The test is based on the following regression
 qi = wi q + "i ; (17)
where  qi denotes the demeaned quality index of building i, and  q is a column vec-
tor that contains the demeaned quality index of all observed buildings (including
observation i). wi is the i-th row of a symmetric inverse-distance weight matrix
with typical element wij = 1=d(i;j). d(i;j) denotes the Euclidean distance between
observations i and j. All elements wij with i = j are set to zero. Furthermore, the
weights for observations outside a threshold radius (r = 1000m) are set to zero as
well.35 The unknown parameter  measures the degree of spatial autocorrelation.
Here, a value of  1 indicates perfect dispersion and a value of +1 perfect clustering
34A site's distance to its CBD, on the other hand, has a signicant negative impact on the price
of land. This nding is in line with a negative rent gradient as implied by the classic Alonso-Muth
model of urban land use.
35We have also tried cut-o points of 500m, 2000m, and 3000m. These dierent neighborhood
sizes did not qualitatively change the results presented in Table 5.
29of building qualities. "i is a random error term assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and constant variance.
We t Eq. 17 separately for the west and the east halves of Berlin by least
squares to the quality index data. For each half of the city, we run regressions
using all observed buildings regardless of the construction period, as well as separate
regressions for each of the three periods. For each regression, we calculate z-statistics
for the null hypothesis that  = 0 according to the formulas in Anselin (1988, p 102).
The null implies no spatial autocorrelation.
[Table 5 about here.]
Estimation results for the west half are reported in Panel A of Table 5. The estimated
spatial autocorrelation coecient, b , is positive and statistically signicant for all
four estimates. This implies that single-family buildings in the west half are spatially
clustered by quality. The degree of spatial autocorrelation is greatest for buildings
constructed before 1949 and since reunication in 1990, respectively. Estimation
results for the east half are reported in Panel B. As for the west half sub-samples,
we nd a positive and statistical signicant spatial autocorrelation coecient for all
four estimates. The point estimate of the spatial correlation coecient is smallest
for buildings constructed between 1949-1989 in the GDR. It also has the smallest
z-statistic. Thus, providing further evidence that housing investments during the
GDR were mainly driven by exogenous factors. Table 5 provides evidence for the
clustering of the quality of single-family buildings in Berlin. Buildings are therefore
homogeneous in and heterogenous between neighborhoods. This result is consistent
with households whose marginal willingness to pay for building quality is aected
by neighborhood amenities.
305.3 Building quality and quality of surrounding buildings
The third implication of the model is that the impact of given amenities on the
quality of newly-constructed buildings will be enforced if the quality of neighboring
buildings are complements for each other. We use a dierence-in-dierences method-
ology to test for the presence of a complementary feedback eect.36 The baseline
estimation equation is the following





t + "ig;t ; (18)
where the dependent variable is the quality of building i that has been constructed
either before 1949 (t = before) or after 1989 (t = after). The subscript g indicates
the neighborhood in which a house is located. We delineate neighborhoods according
to the statistical areas as shown in Figure 1. D
After
t is a binary indicator that is
set to one if a building has been constructed after 1989. This time dummy variable
and the neighborhood-specic intercept 0g control, respectively, for shifts in city-
wide building quality over time and persistent dierences between neighborhoods.37
DEast
g is a binary indicator that is set to one if the building's neighborhood is in the
east half of Berlin. The coecient of interest is 2, which measures the quality gain
of newly-constructed houses in the east half relative to houses constructed before
1949, relative to the same quality gain for houses located in the west half.
The key identifying assumption in Eq. 18, and also the following model spec-
ications, is that the error term is uncorrelated with both the time period t and
neighborhood g. Therefore, we assume E["ig;tjg;t] = 0. This implies that the co-
ecient 2 would be zero in the absence of a leveled quality standard in eastern
neighborhoods caused by the buildings constructed during 1949{1989. In this case,
ordinary least squares identies the sign of the endogenous feedback eect of given
36Strictly speaking, and in line with the theoretical model, we cannot distinguish between a
complementary and a substitutive feedback eect when the later has an endogenous eect that is
stronger than the initial eect. We presume that the is an unlikely setting.
37The observed building quality may increases over time due to changes in building technology.
31built environment on newly-constructed buildings. Given our prior of a complemen-
tary feedback eect, we expect that 2 < 0.
A drawback of Eq. 18 is that the binary treatment indicator measures the low
quality additions to the housing stock in the east half rather crudely. We therefore
also conduct a rened analysis that exploits the variation of treatment intensities
across neighborhoods in the east half. In particular, let FHg denote the fraction of
the housing stock (as in 1990) in neighborhood g that has been constructed during
1949{1989. We obtain this variable from census data provided by Berlin's Statistical
Oce. Interacting this variable with the binary treatment indicator in Eq. 18 yields
the following estimation equation





t  FHg + "ig;t : (19)
The coecient 2 now measures the quality gain of newly-constructed houses in the
east half dependent on the concentration of low-quality addition to the respective
neighborhood, relative to the quality gain in the west half. We expect again that
2 < 0.
To further verify the robustness of the estimates obtained from Eqs. 18 and 19,
we exploit that in some neighborhoods in the east half no signicant additions to
the housing stock were made during the period 1949-1989. Utilizing these untreated
neighborhoods as an additional control group will lead to a version of Eq. 18 with a
second-order interaction as the key explanatory variable (Meyer, 1995, 4.3).38 The
approach thus allows us to control for two kinds of potentially confounding trends.
First, systematic dierences in quality changes across neighborhoods in, both, the
west and east halves with a high fraction of buildings constructed during 1949-1989.
Second, lasting changes in the entire east half of Berlin that are not related to the
built environment but may aect the quality of newly constructed buildings.
We specically dene neighborhoods as untreated when the housing stock in the
year 1990 is made up of less than one third of buildings that have been constructed
38This methodology is also known as the dierence-in-dierence-in-dierences estimator.
32between 1949{1989.39 Let DFH
g be a binary indicator that takes the value one if
a building is located in a treated neighborhood. The estimation equation is then
given by

















t + "ig;t ; (20)
where all variables are dened as before. The coecient of interest is 4 and measures
the quality gain of newly-constructed buildings in eastern neighborhoods with a
high fraction of buildings constructed during 1949-1989, relative to same the quality
gain in western neighborhoods with a high fraction of buildings constructed during
1949-1989, and relative to eastern neighborhoods with a low fraction of buildings
constructed during 1949-1989. Given our prior of a complementary feedback eect,
we expect that 4 < 0.
[Table 6 about here.]
Table 6 presents ordinary least squares estimates of Eqs. 18 to 20. The reported
standard errors are corrected for intra-neighborhood correlation. We estimate each
of the three regressions with two specications. The rst specication includes only
the baseline variables as discussed above. The second specication adds additional
control variables to adjust for observable dierences between neighborhoods in both
periods. These include the distance to Berlin's CBDs, an indicator for buildings
located at a lake, and the district-level share of votes for the Social Democratic Party
in the federal elections of 1928 and 1994, respectively. All specications include a
full set of neighborhood dummies.
In what follows, we will concentrate on our baseline specications. This is be-
cause the inclusion of the additional control variables does not considerably aect
39Given the amount of destructed residential buildings during WWII, it is impossible to dene
control neighborhoods with zero or near zero post-1949 buildings.
33the coecient estimates of interest, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively.40
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 6 report estimates of Eqs. 18 and 19. As expected
the estimated eect of the GDR treatment is negative and statistically signicant.
The magnitude of the estimated coecient b 2 in column (1) implies that the quality
of a newly-constructed house in the east half of Berlin is on average 16.1 index points
lower than one would expect in the absence of low quality additions to the hous-
ing stock during 1949{1989. Compared to a newly-constructed house with median
quality in the west half this decrease in the quality index translates into a building
value loss of about 23,300 Euros; a relative loss of about 14.9 percent.41 In column
(3), this gure ranges from 9,900 to 26,000 Euros (a relative loss of 6.4 to 16.7 per-
cent) for neighborhoods with a fraction of 18.7 and 48.6 percent of GDR buildings,
respectively.42
Column (5) of Table 6 reports estimates of Eq. 19. The estimated coecient
of interest, b 4, is negative and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. As
expected, the point estimate of b 4 is slightly larger than the estimates in Column
(1). Its magnitude implies a quality decrease of 18.5 index points in eastern neigh-
borhoods with a large fraction of buildings constructed during 1949{1989 compared
to similarly treated neighborhoods in the west half and untreated neighborhoods in
the east half. This decrease in the quality index translates into a building value loss
of about 25,300 Euros; a loss of 16.3 percent relative to the median quality house.
The relatively large standard error of the point estimate is mainly attributable to
the inclusion of additional control neighborhoods, which leaves less independent
variation for identication of the treatment eect. Thus, even after controlling for
40The estimated coecients on the control variables have reasonable signs and are statistically
signicant in most cases.












where c is the es-
timated coecient value of the treatment eect (b 2 or b 3). The conditioning set x
0 collects the
median characteristics of a single-family house constructed since 1990; the age is set to zero. b F
 1
is computed from the nonparametric cdf estimate described in Appendix A.3.
42The range corresponds to the 5 and 95 percent percentile of the FHg distribution.
34unobserved neighborhood changes in the the east half that are not related to the
built environment, we nd evidence for a complementary feedback eect.
6 Conclusion
From a theoretical perspective, the quality of natural amenities and existing build-
ings in a neighborhood are a positive externality, generating benets for its resi-
dents. The variation of these amenities throughout an urban area can thus explain
geographic variation in land values. If natural amenities and building qualities are
complements for each other, such externalities can further motivate the variation of
building qualities between neighborhoods that is typical for most cities. Both im-
pacts of neighborhood amenities will be enforced by an endogenous feedback eect
when housing investments between neighbors are complements as well.
In this paper we presented evidence for the presence of such an endogenous
feedback eect. Berlin's unique recent history provides the exogenous source of
variation in building qualities that is needed to disentangle the natural amenity
eect and the complementary feedback eect. Our estimates show that the quality
of newly-built houses in the east half of Berlin is signicantly lower than one would
expect in the absence of the low-quality additions to the housing stock that were
made during the division of the city. Relative to a newly-constructed building of
median quality in the untreated west half this quality decrease leads, on average,
to a building value loss of 23,300 Euro. Evidently, the magnitude of the building
value loss depends on the particular treatment of neighborhoods in the east half of
Berlin during the socialistic period. That said, our evidence points to a economically
signicant feedback eect of housing investments.
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In the case of symmetric endogenous eects, bis = b for i;s = 1;:::;S with i 6= s.
The (S  S) matrix C has then ones on its diagonal and  b elsewhere. The matrix
C 1 has f1 (S  2)bgu 1 on its diagonal and bu 1 elsewhere, where u  f1 (S  
2)b   (S   1)b2g. Symmetry implies that an increase in the exogenous externality j
aects all sites equally. The quality adjustment is









for s = 1;:::;S. The rst term on the right-hand side is the multiplier. If b = 0,
one building's quality is neither substitute nor complement for the quality of other
buildings and the multiplier becomes one. The building quality in a neighborhood
will increase with an increase of the exogenous amenity, but the initial eect will
neither be enforced nor weakened by endogenous quality adjustments. If the qualities
36are complements, then 0 < b < (S   1) 1, where the second inequality follows from
Eq. 7. In this case, the multiplier is strictly positive. To see this, observe rst that
u increases if b > 0 becomes smaller; observe second that if b were (S   1) 1, then
u = 0. This implies u > 0. Observing further that 1 + b > 0, the multiplier is
therefore strictly positive. Moreover, it is easy to check that the multiplier is larger
than one. In the case of complements, the eect of a change in an exogenous amenity
is therefore enforced. If qualities are substitutes,  (S 1) 1 < b < 0, where the rst
inequality follows from Eq. 7. It follows from these inequalities that both 1 + b > 0
and u > 0, so that the multiplier in Eq. A2 is strictly positive. However, it is easy to
check that the multiplier is smaller than one. Some of the initial eect on building
qualities is crowded-out by the endogenous substitutive eect. Symmetry ensures,
however, that the net eect is still positive.
A.2 Semiparametric land price regression
Estimation algorithm
To estimate the partial linear model given by Eq. 14 we proceed as follows. First,
nonparametric kernel estimates of
\ E[lnpL
itjli;si;t] and, respectively, \ E[zitjli;si;t] (A3)
are constructed. We specically employ the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator
(H ardle et al., 2004, Ch. 4). The weights that are assigned to each observation
are derived from a Gaussian product kernel function and put more weight on ob-
servations which are closer to observation i. The corresponding bandwidths are
selected by the cross-validation algorithm explained in Appendix A.4. Second, the
parametric regression
lnpL
it   \ E[lnpL
itjli;si;t] =
h
zit   \ E[zitjli;si;t]
i
 + i (A4)
is tted via ordinary least squares. Robinson (1988) shows that the estimates of
 that are obtained by this method are
p
n-consistent. Third, the nonparametric
37regression
lnpL
it   zitb  = m(lit;si;t) + it (A5)
is tted via the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator. Again the bandwidths are se-
lected by the cross-validation algorithm explained below. This regression leads to
an consistent estimate of the nonparametric part of Eq. 14. Finally, we predict the
(log) notional land value for a house at location l0 with lot size s0 that is sold at
time t by
lnvL
0t = z0tb  + b m(l0;s0;t) : (A6)
Estimates of the parametric eects
We t Eq. 14, to the data on undeveloped residential land, see Table 2. The
vector zit includes binary indicator variables for unusual features of the lot, unusual
business circumstances, and the level of recoupment charge for public infrastructure.
Table A1 presents estimates of the parametric eects. The estimated coecients are
statistically signicant. The signs of the point estimates, as well as the magnitude
are reasonable. Moreover, the overall t of the model, as measured by the R2, is
remarkably well.
[Table A1 about here.]
A.3 Nonparametric estimation of conditional cdf
In order to estimate Eq. 13 for a building with building value vB
0 and structural














where N is the total number of observations. G(v) is the distribution function





38with h0 being the bandwidth associated with vB
i and Kh() denoting the Gaussian







where Kh() is the product kernel for C continuous variables derived from the Gaus-
sian kernel. L(xd
i;xd
0) is the product kernel for D binary variables that is derived












where the bandwidth d 2 [0;1]. All bandwidth parameters are selected by the
cross-validation algorithm explained in Appendix A.4.
A.4 Bandwidth selection algorithm
We select the bandwidth parameters in Eqs. A3, A5, and A7 by minimizing a least-
squares cross-validation objective function. Given the large number of observations
a cross-validation procedure using the full sample size is, however, computational
infeasible in a reasonable amount of time. We therefore employ a variant of the
ecient cross-validation algorithm outlined in Racine (1993). The algorithm is based
on the observation that the optimal bandwidth for variable j with respect to the
asymptotic mean integrated square error takes the form
hj;opt = cjjN ; (A11)
where j is the variable's standard deviation and  is a known constant that depends
on the kernel order and number of variables involved. The unknown scaling factor
c depends in a non-trivial way on the kernel function and the underlying distribu-
tion function, see e.g. H ardle et al. (2004, Ch. 3). Exploiting the fact the scaling
factor c does not depend on the sample size, leads to following bandwidth selection
procedure:
391. Draw s (s = 500) subsamples of size ns (ns = 500) without replacement from
the entire data set.
2. Find the optimal bandwidths and scaling factors for each subsample by mini-
mizing the cross-validation criterion function via numerical search.
3. Compute the cross-validated bandwidths for the entire sample by replacing cj
in the formula for hj;opt with the median of the s scaling factors obtained in
step 2.
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44Table 1: Summary statistics for single-family houses by period of construction
and half of the city. Mean of variables. Standard deviations of variables are in brackets.
House price is transaction price for the bundle of building and land. Land value is prediction
from tted Eq. 14. Building value is house price net of land value. All prices and values are
in thousand year 2000 Euros. Quality index per building is prediction from Eq. 13.
(1) (2) (3)
before 1949 1949 to 1989 after 1989
West East West East West East
Panel A: price and quality index
House price [281.94] [156.88] [252.33] [180.74] [285.76] [207.26]
[214.27] [85.11] [156.21] [80.81] [156.29] [62.54]
Land value [162.39] [84.39] [132.24] [99.22] [75.11] [47.15]
[140.53] [46.32] [114.81] [50.35] [77.75] [23.13]
Building value [119.55] [71.94] [120.10] [81.52] [210.64] [160.11]
[143.37] [67.78] [101.56] [61.56] [107.98] [53.72]
Quality index [0.512] [0.499] [0.512] [0.441] [0.577] [0.452]
[0.288] [0.253] [0.273] [0.261] [0.273] [0.259]
Panel B: lot and oor size
Floor size (in sqm) [155.68] [137.19] [142.87] [141.71] [163.06] [132.93]
[69.36] [60.16] [49.94] [58.83] [38.78] [39.58]
Lot size (in sqm) [616.90] [705.60] [556.84] [828.82] [373.58] [394.91]
[347.96] [339.23] [296.33] [328.49] [214.42] [215.90]
No of Observations 5,089 2,752 5,881 864 1,727 2,647
45Table 2: Summary statistics for transacted residential sites. Number of observations
is 20,754. Price is in year 2000 Euros. CBD is the Breitscheidplatz for Berlin's west half and
the Alexanderplatz for the east half. The quality of neighborhood amenities is measured for
each site with the expert-based rating provided by Berlin's Senate Department for Urban
Development.
Mean Std. Dev. Units
Panel A: price and continuous characteristics
Price per sqm 160.23 105.00 Euro
Distance to CBD 12.48 3.97 Km
Panel B: amenity quality rating
Low quality 38.34% Medium quality 47.61%
High quality 14.05%
Panel C: unusual features of lot
Ground monument 0.52% Lake side 2.10%
Demolished structure 36.04% Land easement 21.03%
Panel D: recoupment charge for public infrastructure
full charge 26.86% reduced charge 26.63%
Panel E: business circumstances
Non-private seller 28.58% Non-private buyer 10.23%
Personal relations 6.34% Other unusual 7.19%
46Table 3: Wilcoxon rank-sum test on conditional distribution of quality in-
dex. Sample is divided by half of the city. Column (1) tests the null hypothesis
that the quality measure has the same distribution in the west (qW) and the east (qE)
half in the respective period. z-statistic reports the standardized Wilcoxon test-statistic:




n ) 1=2, where T is the sum of ranks for the observations in the
west half sample, nj (j 2 fWest;Eastg) is the number of observations in each sample, n is
the total number of observations, and s is the standard deviation of the combined ranks for
both samples. P-value is for N(0;1) distribution. Column (2) gives the probability that the
quality of a building in the west half is larger than the quality of a building in the east half.
P-value is calculated as p = (T   (
nW(nW+1)
2 ))=(nWnE)), where T is the sum of ranks for
the observations in the west sample.
(1) (2)
=Pr(qW > qE)
= Pr(qW 6 qE) Pr(qW > qE) No of Obs.
z-Stat. P-Value P-Value West East
constructed before 1949 2.156 0.031 0.515 5,089 2,752
constructed 1949{1989 7.101 0.000 0.575 5,881 864
constructed after 1989 14.822 0.000 0.632 1,727 2,647
47Table 4: Eect of amenity level on price of undeveloped land. Table reports OLS
estimates of Eq. 16. CBD is the Breitscheidplatz for the west half and the Alexanderplatz
for the east half. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Clustering corrects for
intra-district correlation of residuals. *** signicant at 1%-level **signicant at 5%-level
*signicant at 10%-level.
Dependent variable: ln land price per sqm
Specication (1) (2)
low amenity level -0.100 [0.036] -0.089 [0.032]
high amenity level 0.106 [0.051] 0.078 [0.045]
ln distance to CDB -0.351 [0.079]
Lake side 0.335 [0.040]
Ground monument -0.269 [0.103]
Demolished structure -0.121 [0.020]
Land easement 0.020 [0.009]
Full charge -0.071 [0.030]
Reduced charge -0.047 [0.024]
Non-private seller -0.088 [0.017]
Non-private buyer 0.068 [0.018]
Personal relations -0.218 [0.024]
Unusual circumstance 0.003 [0.036]
District dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes
 R2 0.513 0.568
No of Observations 20,754 20,754
48Table 5: Moran's test for spatial autocorrelation of building qualities. Table
reports least squares estimates of Eq. 17. z-statistic is for the null hypothesis that building
quality is not spatially autocorrelated. E[] and V[] under the null are calculated according
to the formulas in Anselin (1988, p 102). P-value is for N(0;1) distribution.
Dependent variable: Demeaned quality index
b  z-stat. P-value No of obs.
Panel A: Westberlin
all 0.200 91.204 0.000 12,697
before 1949 0.296 63.553 0.000 5,089
1949{1989 0.134 31.211 0.000 5,881
after 1989 0.383 35.239 0.000 1,727
Panel B: Eastberlin
all 0.151 39.446 0.000 6,263
before 1949 0.140 18.864 0.000 2,752
1949{1989 0.115 5.942 0.000 864































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































50Table A1: Least squares estimate of parametric eect on land price. Table reports
estimates of the parametric part of the partial linear model given in Eq. 14. Standard errors
are reported in brackets. R2 is calculated for the overall t of partial linear model. ***
signicant at 1%-level ** signicant at 5%-level * signicant at 10%-level.
Dependent variable: ln land price
Ground monument -0.270 [0.036]
Demolished structure 0.035 [0.005]
Land easement -0.110 [0.006]
Full recoupment charge -0.042 [0.007]
Partial recoupment charge -0.044 [0.006]
Non-private seller -0.063 [0.005]
Non-private buyer 0.094 [0.008]
Unusual circumstances -0.028 [0.009]
Personal circumstances -0.164 [0.010]
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Histogram of year of construction. 18,961 single-family house transactions
that occurred in Berlin between 1996{2008. World War II lasted from 1939 to 1945. The
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